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Barron and Klein (1) highlight the importance of a
simulation-based account of planning ahead as a
central mechanism to allow for basic cognitive prop-
erties. They relate this on a functional level to a de-
tailed architecture of central circuits in the human
midbrain. As a major contribution, they further com-
pare these structures with functionally similar ones in
the insect brain. They assume that central to both
structures is an integrating and predictive model of
the body, including aspects of the environment.
Therefore, they conclude that the ability to plan
ahead, using such a body model for internal simula-
tion, is not unique to humans or vertebrates, but is a
more general and older principle already present in
some invertebrates, particularly insects.
They further relate the concept of internal simu-
lation to the notion of consciousness, and particu-
larly to subjective experience. From our point of
view, mental simulation and relating oneself to the
environment are certainly requirements for phenom-
enal consciousness. However, it is not shown in any
way that these capabilities necessarily lead to sub-
jective experience. Therefore, in our view, the article is
not contributing to the discussion of subjective expe-
rience. Instead of trying to argue on this slippery
ground, we propose to leave aside completely the
question concerning subjective experience, which
Chalmers characterizes as “the hard problem” (2). In-
stead, we should focus on a description on the func-
tional level, which allows us, following Cleeremans (3),
to divide consciousness into access consciousness and
reflexive consciousness. Importantly, this approach
matches well with the functional view of Barron and
Klein (1) without the need to use the concept of
subjective experience.
Following such an approach provides a functional
and testable account of parts of consciousness. Here,
we agree that this can already be found in quite simple
systems. Modeling approaches can be used to test for
such emergent properties. As one example, we mod-
eled an insect-based approach for walking that reflects,
on a detailed level, behavioral and, to some extent,
neurophysiological findings, including action selection
on different levels of the reactive system (4). When
this approach was extended to include a functional
model of the body in relation to the environment,
the system was shown to allow for planning ahead (5)
and, as we argued in detail, fulfilled the basic con-
ditions required for access consciousness (3). In this
way, such an insect-based model constitutes a func-
tional description for access consciousness without
the need of discussing the concept of subjective
experience, but it is still well in agreement with the
core mechanism described by Barron and Klein (1).
Our computational approach (5), which is currently
being implemented on a physical robot to validate
these hypotheses, shows that one requirement is the
ability to decouple the body model from the motor
output. Secondly, the model has to be manipulable.
Even though these requirements only introduce
small changes into the insect-based systems, they
have, to date, not been shown in insects. Corre-
spondingly, a central “metric place” is not required
to describe the navigation behavior known from
central-place foragers (ref. 5 and references therein).
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